7 domande su Google-Yahoo
17/06/08 06:28
di AntonioDopo mesi in cui Yahoo ha provato a spuntare un prezzo più alto per la 'scalata' di Microsoft, un prezzo più alto del già incredibile alto prezzo della offerta di Gates, arriva la notizia di un accordo orizzontale con Google. Dal punto di vista della logica economica e industriale, la cosa sorprende perché si sostituisce una concentrazione verticale con un accordo, apparentemente tecnico, di natura orizzontale tra due concorrenti.Dal punto di vista antitrust, possono emergere alcuni problemi: a meno che non sia un 'commitment' apparente da parte diYahoo per alzare il prezzo di vendita futura. Sia come sia, l'American Antitrust Institute ha formulato al Dipartimento di Giustizia americano, 7 domande in merito all'accordo
Eccole:
1. How will the agreement affect competition among the Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! platforms? Would the deal be reasonably likely to lead to the reduction of the number of independent search advertising competitors from three to two, a circumstance that almost always violates the antitrust laws? Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! are not just advertising distributors, however. All three provide competing platforms for information collection, processing and distribution, e.g., email, chat and calendaring services, and they have the potential for competing with one another well into the future as new uses of the Internet are developed. From this broader perspective, advertising may be less a separate market than the revenue-producing lifeblood of these systems.
2. If someone invented a better method of searching the Internet, how long would it likely take to implement the invention and be able to compete effectively with Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft for advertisers? Regardless of whether the relevant market consists of competing systems or competing search advertising algorithms, will Google not only strengthen its dominant position on this critical component for business on the Internet but also be protected from new entry?
3. Will the agreement enable creation of new barriers to entry? Will Google's enhanced share of Internet advertising entail the power to create new barriers to entry such as long- term exclusive contracts with advertisers or content providers which could harm either the search advertising market or competition among systems?
4. To what extent does search advertising compete with display advertising? The decision to allow Google's acquisition of Double-Click would suggest these are separate markets, but what does post-merger experience have to teach us?
5. What percentage of search and display advertising is now placed through intermediaries, such as advertising agencies? If intermediaries purchase a significant quantity of Internet advertising, then special attention needs to be focused on their particular purchasing decisions and needs in addition to that of their clients.
6. How much of a transaction cost savings would arise if advertisers or their intermediaries were to deal with two search companies? In other words, what are the costs associated with having advertising placed through more than one company? By the same token, what are the costs to content providers for carrying ads placed by more than one provider? Do many or most of these intermediaries currently deal with only one search company? Is there a strong preference for "one stop shopping" for their varied clients? And how will the proposed auction system affect this dynamic?
7. Would a combined Google-Yahoo! produce a strong monopoly position in search advertising that would enable them to leverage themselves into a dominant position in display advertising? Dominance in both forms of Internet advertising could be expected to result in even higher prices to advertisers and lower shares of revenue to content providers since neither would have access to substitute products.
1. How will the agreement affect competition among the Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! platforms? Would the deal be reasonably likely to lead to the reduction of the number of independent search advertising competitors from three to two, a circumstance that almost always violates the antitrust laws? Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! are not just advertising distributors, however. All three provide competing platforms for information collection, processing and distribution, e.g., email, chat and calendaring services, and they have the potential for competing with one another well into the future as new uses of the Internet are developed. From this broader perspective, advertising may be less a separate market than the revenue-producing lifeblood of these systems.
2. If someone invented a better method of searching the Internet, how long would it likely take to implement the invention and be able to compete effectively with Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft for advertisers? Regardless of whether the relevant market consists of competing systems or competing search advertising algorithms, will Google not only strengthen its dominant position on this critical component for business on the Internet but also be protected from new entry?
3. Will the agreement enable creation of new barriers to entry? Will Google's enhanced share of Internet advertising entail the power to create new barriers to entry such as long- term exclusive contracts with advertisers or content providers which could harm either the search advertising market or competition among systems?
4. To what extent does search advertising compete with display advertising? The decision to allow Google's acquisition of Double-Click would suggest these are separate markets, but what does post-merger experience have to teach us?
5. What percentage of search and display advertising is now placed through intermediaries, such as advertising agencies? If intermediaries purchase a significant quantity of Internet advertising, then special attention needs to be focused on their particular purchasing decisions and needs in addition to that of their clients.
6. How much of a transaction cost savings would arise if advertisers or their intermediaries were to deal with two search companies? In other words, what are the costs associated with having advertising placed through more than one company? By the same token, what are the costs to content providers for carrying ads placed by more than one provider? Do many or most of these intermediaries currently deal with only one search company? Is there a strong preference for "one stop shopping" for their varied clients? And how will the proposed auction system affect this dynamic?
7. Would a combined Google-Yahoo! produce a strong monopoly position in search advertising that would enable them to leverage themselves into a dominant position in display advertising? Dominance in both forms of Internet advertising could be expected to result in even higher prices to advertisers and lower shares of revenue to content providers since neither would have access to substitute products.
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